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Scepticism, Liberalism and Illiberalism:
An Inquiry Into The Implications of Doubt
In Human all too Human, Nietzsche writes:
Probable victory of scepticism. - Let us for once accept the 
validity of the sceptical point of departure: if there were no
other, metaphysical world and all explanations of the only world 
known to us drawn from metaphysics were useless to us, in what 
light would we then regard men and things? This question can be 
thought through, and it is valuable to do so...For the 
historical probability is that one day mankind will very 
possibly become in general and on the whole in this matter; thus 
the question becomes: what shape will human society then assume 
under the influence of such an attitude of mind?1
Today, this question about scepticism is an important
one. On both the Left and the Right, whether it be
among proponents of postmodernism, communicative
ethics, natural right or communitarianism, there is
widespread consensus that traditional justifications
for our liberal democratic way of life, be they appeals
to either transparent reason, nature, or religion, have
become problematic. We thus ought to reflect upon our
uncertainties and ask Nietzsche's question: what would
a world full of doubt be like? What are the moral and




























































































At first glance, the answer to this question seems 
unproblematic. Scepticism, the doubt about the 
possibility of rationally justifying moral and 
political belief, seems a purely negative position.” It 
calls into question beliefs and finds justifications 
for them wanting, but provides nothing to replace 
them: doubt is merely corrosive. Thus, scepticism has 
no positive implications at all, for itself it does hot 
generate any moral or political principles to guide 
moral or political life.
To point to the absence of moral or political 
implications of scepticism is not new.3 In fact, it id 
often remarked that scepticism's negativity is even 
more radical. Any existence always requires some kind 
of moral judgement, which scepticism by definition - as 
a state of doubt, or suspension of all judgement, 
prevents. Thus, if one tried to follow the sceptic and 
suspend all judgement, one could never make any 
decision, nor act at all. Scepticism would make any 




























































































criticism. He writes: "all discourse, all action would
immediately case; and men remain in total lethargy" 
were total scepticism to prevail, in fact, "all human 
life [would] perish. "4 A similar criticism is made by 
Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of the Eminent 
Philosophers. In a chapter devoted to the life of 
Pyrrho, the original Greek sceptic, Diogenes observes 
that because of his thorough doubts, whether of his 
perceptions of oncoming wagons or cliffs, or his 
evaluative judgements, whether or not he should avoid 
precipices or oncoming wagons, Pyrrho was not able to 
make any decisions at all. Consequently, Pyrrho took 
"no precaution, but faced all risks as they came, 
whether carts, precipices, or dogs," and was able to 
live only because of his friends, who kept him out of 
harm's way.5
But despite these arguments, there is still debate 
about scepticism's implications. In fact, today it is 
more often argued that scepticism leads to either 






























































































The general argument tying scepticism to 
illiberalism is the following: scepticism is dangerous 
because it corrodes the beliefs necessary to sustain 
liberalism. It undermines both faith in the value and 
justifiability of a liberal democratic way of life as 
well as the ability to defend it against those who 
oppose it. Scepticism thus prepares the way for 
illiberalism by giving no principled reasons to raise 
against such opponents. Moreover, scepticism is also 
dangerous because it frees the will from moral 
restraint, or as Aristocles of Messina already asked 
the Pyrrhonist sceptic two thousand years ago, "what 
evil deeds would not he dare, who held that nothing is 
really evil, or disgraceful, or just or unjust?"6
Contemporary positions about the dangers of 
scepticism appeal to various elements of this general 
argument. Some of these claims are historical ones. 
For example, Richard Tuck claims that in the history of 
17th century political thought, scepticism led to the 




























































































as the one indubitable principle around which political 
life could be organized, "and if there is a set of 
political techniques available which can be used to 
secure civil peace...then those techniques must be used 
by the state or the prince, and no general moral or 
legal principles have any standing against them."' 
Here moral and religious scepticism "was often linked 
with a programme of what we would take to be excessive 
ideological repression."8 Tuck notes that seventeenth 
century sceptics, particularly Charron or Descartes, 
were attracted to a radically prudential politics, as 
is demonstrated by their enthusiasm for the thought of 
Machiavelli. In this case, Aristocles' prediction seems 
to come true: in a sceptical world, what is politically 
permissible becomes radically expanded.
Tuck points to the illiberalism of some 
seventeenth century sceptics only to indicate that 
scepticism has not always been historically accompanied 
by toleration. A more strident claim tying scepticism 
to illiberalism is made by the conservative thinker Leo 
Strauss. Although Strauss' approach to political theory 




























































































from the Cambridge historical methodology of Tuck, 
Strauss agrees with Tuck's conclusion about the 
potential illiberal implications of scepticism. 
Moreover, for Strauss, scepticism is not merely 
potentially dangerous, but rather, always dangerous.
Strauss's argument reflects the influence of Plato 
and Nietzsche. Strauss follows Plato's teaching of the 
cave in The Republic: all political societies are ruled 
by myths or lies which provide their legitimacy, 
shadows dancing upon the walls of the cave. He claims 
that "every political society that ever has been or 
ever will be rests on a particular fundamental opinion 
which cannot be replaced by knowledge and hence is of 
necessity a particular and particularistic society."9 
Consequently, Enlightenment faith in reason and 
universal questioning will culminate in scepticism, for 
it will reveal these legitimizing principles as merely 
shadows. Moreover, according to Strauss, once it is 
politicized, or universalized, this scepticism will 
decay into a cluster of related dogmatic beliefs: an 
unquestioning acceptance of relativism, historicism and 




























































































"crisis of the West": the West has become dangerously 
crippled by fundamental doubts about its own 
legitimizing principles.
Strauss' argument also reflects Nietzsche's 
influence. And according to Nietzsche, scepticism can 
be dangerous in two ways. The first - an argument to 
which Strauss does not appeal - is a variation on the 
ancient criticism of scepticism found in Diogenes 
Laertius through Hume: scepticism is dangerous because 
it makes life psychologically impossible. Doubt is "the 
great blood-sucker, the spider scepticism," which leads 
to the "paralysis of the will."10 Second, Nietzsche 
indicates there is also another kind of scepticism. One 
type of doubt may be psychologically destructive, but 
the other, a "more dangerous and harder form of 
scepticism", unleashes and frees the will, for it finds 
all moral beliefs merely, in Nietzsche's famous words, 
pleading for prejudices. The will, not reason, is 
fundamental.11 And so, in Nietzsche's notorious 
formulation, if nothing is forbidden, then everything 
is permitted. Or as Strauss writes, following 




























































































than our blind preferences, everything a man is willing 
to dare will be permissible."12
Strauss's conclusion is not unlike the position 
Tuck attributes to seventeenth century sceptical 
illiberals: by raising doubts about moral principles, 
scepticism vastly opens up the realm of the politically 
possible. But are these arguments convincing?
Let us begin with Strauss' argument. Here we 
find a number of elements which make a necessary link 
between scepticism and illiberalism less plausible. 
First, we should be careful to distinguish doubt from 
denial, scepticism from nihilism. Strictly speaking, 
scepticism is only a state of doubt. Sextus Empiricus 
emphasizes this point in the beginning his Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism. He differentiates the sceptic from both 
those who "think they have discovered the truth" and 
those who claim that there is no truth, "that things 
cannot be apprehended."13 Arguments attributing 
illiberal consequences to scepticism are often not 
sufficiently attentive to this distinction. Nietzsche's 
claim - which inspires Strauss - that nothing is 




























































































justice, no good or evil, are both positions committed 
to the position that no valid moral principles exist. 
The sceptic, to the contrary, is only in a state of 
doubt - uncertain whether there are, or are not, valid 
moral principles which govern the world.
This clarification, of course, is not enough to 
exonerate scepticism from illiberal associations. 
"Nothing is forbidden" may be grounded in nihilism 
rather than only scepticism, but if scepticism is an 
inherently unstable category, as we have observed, then 
it should not be surprising that doubt may be 
transformed into denial, that scepticism slips into 
nihilism. Scepticism would still remain the source of 
this nihilism (consistent with Strauss' warning that 
scepticism will always transform itself into varieties 
of stronger dogmatic positions.) Moreover, it is still 
possible to interpret the proposition "nothing is 
forbidden," not as the stronger, and dogmatic, position 
of the nihilist, but as a sceptical one - that whether 
or not anything is forbidden is only radically 
uncertain, not categorically denied. In either case, 




























































































remains the premise of the argument that leads to the 
illiberal conclusion, nothing is forbidden.
What is more important, however, is to be careful 
about what we mean by conclusions following from 
premises. "Nothing is forbidden" may or may not be a 
sceptical proposition. But there are two equally 
logical conclusions which can be derived from this 
premise. The first is Nietzsche's: everything is
permitted. But the second, and equally as logical 
conclusion, is that nothing is permitted, because 
nothing is justified.14 To unequivocally claim that 
scepticism naturally leads to illiberalism fails to 
acknowledge that scepticism can as logically radically 
open possibilities of action as well as restrict them.
Strauss' argument tying scepticism to illiberalism 
not only confounds the necessary with the possible, but 
also places inordinately high demands on philosophy. 
For to claim that scepticism will unleash action rather 
than restrict it is based on a misplaced assumption 
about philosophy's power - that philosophy can have a 
proselytizing role, that it can restrain the vicious 




























































































lesson at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics - the 
instruction of ethics will only be effective to those 
who are already predisposed to learn it in the first 
place: philosophy cannot do more than that, it cannot 
change underlying motivation. Thus, scepticism may lead 
to an unleashing of the will only if one is not 
predisposed to morality in the first place, if one has 
no desire to be just. Otherwise, scepticism might 
create doubts about the content of moral belief, but it 
will leave underlying motivation to demand such belief 
intact. If we accept as unrealistic an expectation that 
the presence of moral principles might change the 
motivations of a potential tyrant, equally so, we 
should accept that scepticism about such principles 
will be irrelevant to such a monster as well: they 
would have acted in such a manner in any case. This 
understanding of the limits of philosophy tames helps 
tame the fear of scepticism.
We can then turn to Tuck's argument. First, his 
historical account is itself not without controversy. 
Tuck claims doubt led seventeenth century sceptics 




























































































reflections. But while his claim may be true in the 
neo-Stoic thought of Lipsius, it is far more disputable 
for those who self-defined themselves as sceptics - 
Charron and Descartes. In these latter two thinkers, 
one must be careful not to confound prudence with 
Machiavellian cunning. In Charron, prudence is not an 
amoral or immoral calculus. Charron, instead, seems to 
follow the classical conception of prudence, as it 
appears for example, in Aristotle's treatment in the 
Nicomachean Ethics - as inextricably tied to justice. 
It is the art of knowing what course of action is best 
for oneself and for others: prudence supplies the means 
while justice offers the end. Unlike, Machiavelli, 
Charron emphasizes that justice is one of the cardinal 
virtues every prince must have - in addition to piety, 
courage and mercy. He writes that "one must find 
abominable those tyrannic and barbarous words which 
free Sovereigns from all law, reason, equity and 
obligation. "15 He does admit that "sometimes it is 
necessary for [the ruler's justice] to bend and 
deviate, to mix prudence with justice, and as one says, 




























































































the skin of the fox," and writes (as Tuck quotes) that 
the Prince may:
secretly dispatch and put to death, or otherwise without forme 
of justice some certain man that is troublesome and pernicious 
to the state, and who well deserveth death, but yet cannot 
without trouble and danger be prevented and repressed by 
ordinary measures; herein nothing but the form is violated. And 
is not the prince above forms?16
Still, though the prince may be above forms, he is not 
above justice. Charron is emphatic that only in the 
greater service of justice may the ruler deviate from 
it. And on those exceptional occasions, the ruler must 
understand the tragic nature of his responsibility and 
act only with "regret and unhappy sighs, understanding 
that it is a tragedy, and a disgraceful blow from 
heaven. 1,17 Finally, Charron warns that a ruler's worst 
error is to begin thinking that everything he can do or 
desire is permitted, for that is "the murderer of the 
prince and the state."18
Descartes' interest in Machiavelli is equally
ambiguous as that of Charron. Despite Tuck's
interpretation, while it is true that Machiavelli is 
one of the only political writers to whom Descartes 
refers, and while he begins his considerations of The 




























































































appear to [him] extremely good", his ultimate 
conclusions on Machiavelli are not simply laudatory. 
Descartes faults Machiavelli for not distinguishing 
between rulers who have gained power through legitimate 
or illegitimate means, and writes that "those who begin 
to found [regimes] through crime are ordinarily 
constrained to continue to commit crimes, and would not 
be able to maintain [their rule] if they wished to be 
virtuous." Even more importantly, Descartes takes issue 
with Machiavelli's dictum that a ruler must learn to be 
evil. He denies both that the ruler should dispense 
with acting on moral principle and that the world is as 
dark as Machiavelli claims. While Descartes allows a 
prince to act as he pleases towards foreign enemies - 
either with "artifice or force", following 
Machiavelli's dictum of being the lion or fox as 
circumstances dictate, he still maintains that one has 
a "right" to do so - not that to act in this way is 
done simply out of necessity. Furthermore, he still 
places moral limits on foreign affairs, for example 




























































































diplomacy, because "friendship is a thing too 
sacred. "19
Still, history aside, we need to examine the logic 
of the argument joining seventeenth century scepticism 
to illiberalism. Tuck claims that here scepticism led 
to the questioning of all moral belief, and that out of 
these doubts, only self-preservation and its 
concomitant political expression, maintenance of civil 
peace emerged as a stable value. And scepticism allows 
for a radically prudential politics in the name of this 
value: everything is permitted in order to establish
peace. But here again, scepticism allows for two 
logical possibilities, it can both restrain and unleash 
action. While the non-sceptical belief in the cardinal 
importance of peace may pull towards unleashing action, 
the countervailing demand for justice - which Charron 
especially recognizes - would lead, instead, to its 
radical constriction. To be fair, Tuck recognizes this 
conceptual link between scepticism and illiberalism 
need not be a necessary one, for he sees two distinct 
paths leading from scepticism: scepticism points not




























































































of custom and the laws of one's society - an observance 
that is consistent with a sceptical restriction of 
action: one cannot decide how to act in principle,
therefore tradition becomes the default line of
. • 20action.
Our reflections on sceptical illiberalism thus end 
on an ambiguous note. Strauss' concerns about 
scepticism's illiberal conclusions may be unduly dark, 
and Tuck's historical account may be disputable, but 
this does not mean that scepticism cannot lead to 
illiberal consequences. However, such consequences are 
not necessary ones. We can now see that there are
additional - and unquestioned assumptions - involved in 
attributing necessary illiberal conclusions to 
scepticism.
Scepticism and Principle: Liberalism and Cruelty
Let us then turn to the opposite position. How is 
scepticism seen to be allied with liberalism? Here 
again there are a number of different arguments. The 




























































































generate a positive moral and political principle. This 
is the argument of the late political theorist Judith 
Shklar, and one that has been more recently taken up by
Richard Rorty.21 She argued there are limits to
scepticism, and that one principle - and indeed the
only universal moral principle - resistant to doubt is 
the principle of cruelty, or rather, the hatred of 
cruelty. Shklar based her liberalism of fear on this 
principle, a " summum malum, which all of us know and 
would avoid if only we could. That evil is cruelty and 
the fear it inspires, and the very fear of fear 
itself. "22
Shklar traced the origins of this liberalism to 
post-Reformation Europe and the cruelties of religious 
wars, and to those thinkers, such as Montesquieu, and 
more particularly Montaigne, who "torn by conflicting 
spiritual impulses, became skeptics who put cruelty and 
fanaticism at the very head of the human vices."23 She 
claims skepticism about Christian dogma, which saw 
cruelty much differently because of its presuppositions 
of the fallen nature of man, the consequent necessity 




























































































practices of torture, led Montaigne to see cruelty as 
the universal vice.24
In Shklar's evaluation, fear of cruelty can become 
a "first principle, an act of moral intuition based on 
ample observation."25 And this principle can then 
underwrite a liberalism of fear "if the prohibition of 
cruelty can be universalized and recognized as the 
necessary condition of the dignity of persons."26
Nonetheless, Shklar recognized the problems in 
attempting to derive a moral principle on the basis of 
doubt - she cautioned that while the liberalism of fear 
developed historically out of scepticism, such a 
liberalism need not be based upon it. For the 
difficulty with attempting to generate principles on 
the basis of doubt, is that doubt may extend even 
further and undermine this principle itself.
Nietzsche, of course, forms the strongest 
objection to Shklar, as she herself recognized: he 
raises doubts about the status of cruelty and comes to 
radically different conclusion's about its value.27 But 




























































































about the relation between scepticism and cruelty than 
on Shklar's own interpretation.
In his essay On Cruelty, Montaigne writes that he 
"cruelly hates cruelty, both by nature and by 
judgement, as the extreme of all vices."28 And while 
Shklar may be correct that scepticism led Montaigne to 
hold cruelty as the worst vice, his scepticism does not 
seem to stop there. To the contrary, in the same essay,
he further subjects this position on cruelty to even
greater doubt. And here he observes that both his
nature and judgment do not provide him with the
certainty for which Shklar would hope. He observes that 
human bloodthirstiness gives "proof of a natural 
propensity toward cruelty."29 People may hate cruelty, 
but part of human nature also attracts them to it. 
Moreover, considering the Stoic model of the virtues, 
Montaigne wonders whether virtue requires "difficulty 
and contrast, and cannot be exercised without 
opposition," and considers that perhaps perfect virtue 
is "dependent upon combating pain." Thus, evil and 
perhaps even cruelty are necessary.30 Finally, his 




























































































cruelty itself. Following the ancient sceptics who
claimed that what causes us suffering more than
anything are our fears, fears which are based upon
opinion, and which can be radically tamed through the
sceptical expurgation of opinion,31 Montaigne writes 
that philosophy can free us from our fear of pain and 
death, for "what makes us endure pain so poorly is that 
we are not accustomed to find our principal contentment 
in the soul, and that we do not concentrate enough on 
it." And while he concedes that Pyrrho is wrong in 
thinking that all pain can be conquered, he writes that 
"it is in us, if not to annihilate [pain], at least to 
lessen it by patience, and even should the body be 
disturbed by it, to maintain nevertheless our soul and 
reason, in good trim. 1,32 Montaigne offers the cruel 
sounding admonishment that "we do not escape philosophy 
by stressing immoderately the sharpness of pain and the 
weakness of man."33
One might object that these passages should be 
read as ironic (an objection entirely in the spirit of 
Montaigne's own motto, that "each thing has many angles 




























































































reverse."34) But however one chooses to interpret 
Montaigne's intention, the lesson remains that these 
passages can be used to show how scepticism can lead to 
very different kinds of conclusions about the nature of 
cruelty.
The Ambiguities of Doubt
The example of the relation between cruelty and 
doubt thus further points to scepticism's ambiguities. 
One reason why scepticism may lead to very different 
implications is that what is doubted is not always the 
same - the extent and focus of scepticism is variable, 
as may be the motivation which guides it, as we have 
seen in arguments about sceptical illiberalism. This, 
in itself, is not a very interesting observation. What 
is more interesting is to reflect why doubt's extent 
varies from thinker to thinker - especially among these 
thinkers who self-characterize themselves as sceptics. 
This variability becomes more comprehensible if we 
recall our initial observations about the instability 




























































































is not possible. The nature of doubt thus guarantees 
that scepticism will always be expressed as a mixture 
of doubt and belief. Behind every sceptic there will 
always be non-sceptical belief.
Moreover, attentiveness to this mixture of doubt 
and belief becomes important in understanding how 
scepticism can lead to different political conclusions.
For example, Judith Shklar was well known for her
scepticism.35 Her scepticism was both political and
philosophical. She was a political sceptic because she
held profound suspicions about those who wield power. 
Her thought was also governed by a deeper scepticism, 
one that extended not only to suspicion of power, but 
also to a scepticism about human reason, that through 
scepticism we see "that our judgements are made in the 
dark and doubts they are right."36 But Shklar was 
certainly not just a sceptic. Though she was often 
described as a sceptic and self-characterized herself 
in this way, there are many beliefs she held alongside 
her doubts about which she was not sceptical, among 
which is not merely her belief in the absolute and 




























































































general commitment to liberal politics, especially to 
the defence and advocacy of the powerless, the 
proclaimed goal of her liberalism of fear.37 And it is 
in the service of these undoubted liberal goals, that 
Shklar engaged her scepticism.
Thus, we see that not only is scepticism 
accompanied by belief, but that it is also used for a 
particular non-sceptical purpose. And there are many 
examples here apart from Shklar. The ancient sceptics, 
for example, marshaled all of their doubt in order to 
arrive at ataraxia, or spiritual tranquillity - a goal 
to which they did not extend their doubts. But perhaps 
the best example which illustrates how the conclusions 
of scepticism will depend upon the purpose for which it 
is raised, comes from 17th century religious debates. 
Here scepticism was used both as evidence in support 
feligion as well as atheism.38 We are used to the 
argument joining scepticism to atheism (and in fact, 
today we usually assume that scepticism is anti- 
religious) : doubt calls religion into question, 
scepticism corrodes the revealed truths of revelation. 




























































































argued that scepticism, to the contrary, supports 
Religion. Scepticism reveals to man the poverty of his 
intellectual capabilities. Because one knows so little, 
it would be hubris of the highest order to doubt the 
Church's teaching or authority; scepticism thus points 
to religious submission. Scepticism can thus lead to 
radically different conclusions - and where it leads 
depends on the intention with which it is wielded.
And so, controversy exists about scepticism's 
implications because it is an undetermined, abstract 
category, and, to use a metaphor from Tocqueville, "an 
abstract word is like a false bottom; you may put in it 
what ideas you please and take them out again 
unobserved."39 But debate exists about scepticism' 
implications not only because doubt is accompanied by 
beliefs and purposes which are often not recognized by 
commentators, or even self-acknowledged by self- 
described sceptics. A further reason is due to the 
unstable nature of scepticism itself. One cannot be 
sceptical about everything all the time, and so doubt 
has a necessary tendency to become other things, to 




























































































with it different kinds of moral and political
conclusions.
Scepticism and Toleration
We should now better ’understand other arguments 
linking scepticism and liberalism. The most common way 
in which scepticism is tied to liberalism is through 
sceptically generated moral pluralism. The moral 
pluralist holds there is no one overarching value 
system which governs the universe, rather there are 
many, and there is no way in which one can rank one 
system as superior to the other. Or as Isaiah Berlin 
writes:
pluralism entails that, since it is possible that no final 
answers can be given to moral and political questions, or indeed 
any questions about value, and more than that, that some answers 
that people give, and are entitled to give, are not compatible 
with each other, room must be made for a life in which some 
values may turn out to be incompatible.'10
The premise of the moral pluralist is indeed a 
sceptical one, as other contemporary writers make even 
more explicit than Berlin. For example, Bruce Ackerman 
writes:
But can we kn ow anything about the good? Sure, all of us have 
beliefs; but isn't it pretentious to proclaim one's k n o w le d g e  on  




























































































typically the first to impose his self-righteous certainties on 
others? Rather than welcoming such certainties, they should be 
taken as a sign that your intellectual arteries are 
hardening... the hard truth is this: there is no moral meaning
hidden in the bowels of the universe."41
And in fact, recognition of wide varieties - and 
seemingly irreconcilable - moral beliefs is one of the 
fundamental sources of the historical development of 
scepticism. Sextus Empiricus gives long lists of 
differing moral customs, habits and religious belief.42 
Similarly, Montaigne - often repeating Sextus' own 
lists, famously asks, "what am I to make of a virtue 
that I saw in credit yesterday, that will be
discredited tomorrow, and that becomes a crime on the 
other side of the river? What of a truth that is 
bounded by these mountains and is falsehood to the 
world that lives beyond?"43
But to move from recognition of pluralism as an 
empirical fact to advocating it as a moral value 
involves more than just scepticism. Sometimes these 
beliefs are explicitly acknowledged. For example, 
Isaiah Berlin affirms a belief both in the moral value 
of liberalism and pluralism, and claims that "he 




























































































Another contemporary liberal makes a similar 
claim. Brian Barry writes that:
the sheer weight of the evidence in favour of scepticism seems 
overwhelming. It is hard not to be impressed by the fact that 
so many people have devoted so much effort over so many 
centuries to a matter of the greatest moment with so little 
success in the way of securing rational conviction among those 
not initially predisposed in favor of their conclusions.45
He argues that scepticism is necessary to a neutral
constitution of the principles of justice, but again he
is careful to point out that this scepticism must be
supplemented by a "commitment to finding reasonable
terms of agreement" if it is to generate the principle
of neutrality which he aims to make the basis of
justice.46
In other cases, we need to do more interpretive 
Work to identify the particular mixture of doubt and 
belief that make up a thinker's brand of scepticism. 
For example, in order to understand Montaigne's plea 
for tolerance, that he is "as ready as you please to 
acquit another man from sharing my conditions and 
principles"47 we have to consider not only his emphasis 
on the fundamental importance of peace, but also his 
affirmations of the nascent modern value of the 




























































































self-betterment, and the moral role of friendship. 
Citing the example of Socrates, Montaigne claims that 
we ought to work on our own endless infirmities before 
we censure others, that "our judgement, laying upon 
another the blame which is then in question, should not 
spare us from judging ourselves, " and that we should 
always remember this saying of Plato: "If I find a 
thing unsound, is it not because I myself am 
unsound."48 Montaigne also claims that tolerating 
differences and freely challenging them are a necessary 
part of both self-improvement and friendship, that 
"contradictions of opinions neither offend nor affect 
me; they merely arouse me and exercise me, "49 and that 
to "offend a man for his own good is to have healthy 
love for him."50
Sometimes, however, the beliefs and doubts which 
together make up a thinker's scepticism are not self- 
acknowledged, and this leads to even greater 
controversy about scepticism's implications. Here the 
best example is Richard Rorty, who today makes the 
strongest case for the benefits of scepticism. Rorty 




























































































about the rational justifiability of philosophical 
principles, is very similar to scepticism.51 He claims 
this doubt "helps make the world's inhabitants more 
pragmatic, more tolerant, more liberal."52 But Rorty 
is not sufficiently explicit about the beliefs 
accompanying his ironism - the beliefs which make the 
link from his ironism or scepticism to toleration, and 
so often confounds and frustrates his commentators. 
Many of his critics point that alongside his ironism, 
or scepticism, his three part claim that all moral 
propositions are merely "final vocabularies," culture 
bound expressions which are neither final nor can be 
understood nor even usefully spoken of as mirroring 
reality, are other premises inconsistent with his irony 
because they are unquestioned - his materialism, 
historicism and his Shklar-inspired belief in the vice 
of cruelty.53 And it is particularly this last premise 
- Shklar's claim that cruelty is the one universal vice 
which makes the link between Rorty's ironism and 
toleration: ironism leads to toleration because it is a 




























































































question it dedication to expanding the prevention of 
cruelty.
Scepticism and Character
But if we now better understand why scepticism can 
be interpreted as leading to such widely different 
political principles, why it is, as Shklar describes, 
such an "intellectually flexible" category, we should 
still consider if there is another way scepticism might 
be more directly linked to politics.54 Granted the 
difficulties in trying to generate principles from 
scepticism itself, whether it is cruelty or toleration 
- and seeing that such conclusions always depend on 
accompanying non-sceptical beliefs, perhaps it is more 
fruitful to look at scepticism not as a philosophical 
position, but rather as a psychological attitude - in 
the spirit of Shklar's emphasis on political psychology 
in the study of political theory.55 Does scepticism 
have a transformative function over human character, 





























































































Judith Shklar claimed there is a "psychological 
connection" between scepticism and liberalism."56 She 
argued this psychological link is based upon a modesty 
or humility likely to be generated by doubt. She is not 
the only one to make such a claim. Surprisingly, Leo 
Strauss, for example, despite his greater relative 
fears about the dangers of doubts, paradoxically 
concurs with Shklar. In his writings on education, he 
claims that liberal education is to culminate with an 
intellectual modesty that is a form of philosophical 
scepticism: recognition that fundamental human problems 
will always lie at odds between the solutions offered 
by religion and philosophy. Liberal education is thus 
"training in the highest form of modesty, not to say of 
humility. "57
There is also further evidence in the history of 
scepticism. Sextus Empiricus tells us the Pyrrhonist 
sceptic is moderate or humble almost by definition; 
because his goal is spiritual peace, he shuns the 
seeming chaos and uncertainty of all belief around him. 




























































































should make us behave more modestly and restrainedly in 
our changes . *58
These claims for modesty are based on the premise 
that confrontation with beliefs differing from our own 
force us to reassess our own beliefs, and in this way 
promote humility and modesty. Such reassessment is 
humbling and restraining on the assumption that what 
motivates and guides human behavior are beliefs: if
these beliefs are shaken by scepticism, then actions 
will be restricted as well.59
There is an objection to Shklar, and again it 
comes from Nietzsche. He, of course, claims it
superficial and naive to think opinions are 
fundamental, that what really determines action is not 
reason, and not belief, but rather the will. And
scepticism - the manly, strong variety of scepticism he 
describes, frees the will from belief's constraint. And 
this kind of scepticism is anything but humbling. Who 
should we believe then? Shklar, Montaigne and Sextus, 
or Nietzsche?
There might be less of a disagreement here than 




























































































characterized by a perpetual clash of opposites, and so 
it might seem he thinks scepticism may both lead to 
moderation and unbridled excess; both may be concurrent 
possibilities. After all, Nietzsche writes, "the same 
conditions that hasten the evolution of the herd 
animal, also hasten the evolution of the leader 
animal."60 And indeed, as we have seen, Nietzsche 
distinguishes between two kinds of scepticism, one of 
strength and one of weakness. But despite this duality, 
ultimately it seems that Nietzsche thinks that 
scepticism will more likely lead to widespread 
levelling, or humbling effects than unleashing, 
ruthless ones. For he expends great energy persuading 
that the leader animal will come upon the earth: 
Nietzsche has to bring us the Superman; he does not 
come of his own accord alone.
Scepticism and Indifference
Nonetheless, even if we are convinced that 
scepticism has greater psychological affinities to 




























































































kind of politics scepticism will more likely imply, for 
modesty or moderation is a very ambiguous virtue. It 
is far from clear what kind of citizen would be formed 
by such a virtue alone. We can imagine a modest 
character as compatible with almost every political 
possibility, whether it be liberal, illiberal or 
entirely apolitical. Liberal citizens may be moderate 
ones, but Tocqueville also describes for us equally 
moderate citizens who are perfectly content to live 
under despotism, largely because they are indifferent 
to political life.
And in fact, rather than unleashing the will to 
illiberalism, this last possibility, the association 
between quietude, or political indifference, is the 
most common one in the history of scepticism. 
Describing the life of a Pyrrhonist, Sextus Empiricus 
claims that "we coherently follow, to all appearances, 
an account which shows us a life in conformity with 
traditional customs and the law."61 The ancient sceptic 
follows the rules both because his doubts leave him no 
other guides to conduct, but also because he is 




























































































Sextus Empiricus' writings are particularly striking 
for the entire absence of any treatment of politics at 
all. Similarly, Montaigne advises that "it is the rule 
of rules, and the universal law of laws, that each man 
should observe those of the place he is in,1,63 and that 
one should look inward for tranquility rather than to 
expect such an outcome from politics.63 Descartes is 
also in agreement with Montaigne and Sextus, advising 
that his sceptical seeker of certainty "obey the laws 
and customs of [his] country,"64 and though there is 
scholarly debate about the extent of Descartes' 
political intentions, it is striking that his writings, 
like those of Sextus, are characterized by an almost 
complete silence about politics.
Thus, scepticism again reveals itself as a very 
ambiguous phenomena. It necessarily leads neither to 
liberalism or illiberalism. And the modesty or humility 
which it may generate is equally ambiguous. But if we 
are to look for the dangers of scepticism, from our 
considerations of sceptical modesty, we see that we 
will likely find them in indifference rather than in 
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